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It should thus be said that, in
general, there exist two ways in
which to somehow recognise the
Other: hierarchy and conflict 
(Louis Dumont)
Abstract  
The aim of this paper is to investigate conflicts against Roma settlements by
considering not only the decision-making processes and relations of force,
but also the complex dynamics of the attempts to define the assets that are
the object of conflict wherein rules and authorities are both acknowledged
and criticised. The main topic is related to the sociological debate on the
normative  polarisation  concept,  and  this  paper  suggests  an  analytical
method for defining normative polarisation that considers the state’s active
role  in  promoting  the  racial  exclusion  of  Roma.  Evidence  for  this  study
originates from ten fieldwork case studies in Italy. We will analyse two cases
(Rome and Milan) in which conflicts led to the disintegration of social ties
and the  polarisation  of  normative  positions;  a  compromise  has  not  been
reached because these conflicts have not contributed in any way to mediating
institutions.  Case  studies  in  small  Italian  cities  will  be  subsequently
introduced.  In  these  cases,  institutional  mediation  played  a  role  in  their
respective conflicts’ dynamics by linking the actors and involving them in
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regulation  issues  concerning  resource  allocation  and  coordination  for
delivering collective goods. The main theoretical results focus on the central
role  that  groupings  of  objects,  rules,  and  conventions  play  with  both  a
performative power as law and public policy instrumentation within these
conflicts’ dynamics.
Keywords:  Sociology  of  the  State;  Ethnic  Conflicts;  Roma;  Mediation;
Polarisation; Exclusion.
1. Sociology of the State and Ethnic Conflicts
In  the  introduction  to  his  book on the  rhetoric  of  reaction,
Albert  Hirschman  ponders  the  bewilderment  often  felt  with
regard  to  certain  social  groups’  actions.  With  particular
reference to ethnic groups, Hirschman (1991) observes how the
isolation  of  entire  social  groups  is  a  much  more  troubling
phenomenon  than  is  the  isolation  of  anomic  individuals
repeatedly  studied  by  sociologists:  ‘to  a  certain  extent,  each
group—within  a  horizon  of  total  disorientation  and  often  of
mutual rejection—will come to ask the following question with
regard to the other:  “But how is it  possible for them to have
become like that?”’
Indeed, how is it possible? Societies appear to have broken up
into  several  ‘fragments’  or  heterogeneous  groups  that  do  not
communicate  with,  understand,  or  accept  one  another.
Observations such as this  may be found at  the heart of much
contemporary thought in both the social sciences and political
philosophy. Intellectual engagement reacts to this fragmentation
and  attempts  to  explore  the  identity  tensions  and  ethnic
polarisations flooding the news and alarming the public.
The re-emergence of seemingly irresolvable ethnic conflicts in
Europe  towards  the  end  of  the  1990s  encouraged  various
observers to declare their  deep concern regarding institutions’
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incapacity  to  work  towards  a  compromise  between
irreconcilable  positions.1 However,  the  way  sociologists
conceptualise the link between ethnic conflict and institutional
mediation is not shared and thus presents numerous difficulties.
Particularly,  the  role  of  institutions  in  mediating  rather  than
exasperating contention is often elapsed, which is not something
new to say. In his daunting book, Horowitz (1985: 95) indicates
how ‘the obstacles to a theory of ethnic conflict are formidable.
Until lately, conflict theory has been an impoverished category
of  analysis  in  the  social  sciences.  […]  Among  the  elusive
elements in ethnic conflict theory is an acceptable definition of
conflict’. Thus, the points of tension to be found within different
theoretical  formulations  of  ethnic  conflict  in  sociological
research must be discussed. 
This paper specifically attempts to discuss the links between
ethnic  conflict  and  institutional  mediation  in  Italy—with  a
specific reference to Roma settlements. In order to analyse these
links we acquire recourse to the basic methodological distinction
between  explanans and  explanandum.  Sociology has  come to
embrace  very  different  theoretical  formulations  according  to
whether the polarisation has been considered an explanans or an
explanandum of the conflicts. 
Firstly,  the  literature  that  has  attributed  the  polarisation  of
ethnic  conflicts  to  its  causes  will  be  discussed.  According to
such  an  approach,  a  conflict’s  outcome  depends  upon  the
irreconcilable,  prescriptive  positions  of  the  parties  involved.
1Albert Hirschman (1995: 148) shrewdly underlines that, during the 1990s,
many social scientists could not come to believe that ‘those involved (in a
conflict) could be so closely attached to the issues which are the object of the
conflict’: thus, ‘faced with the emergence or re-emergence of nonnegotiable
arguments,  we hear  the  exclamation:  “May God bring  the  class  struggles
back!”’ 
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Secondly,  another approach in which the possible polarisation
between the rivals’ surfaces from the conflict’s dynamics rather
than  causes  will  be  illustrated.  Thirdly,  evidence  related  to
various Italian cities will be introduced to explain the variation
using  a  configurational  and  dynamic  approach.  Lastly,  I  will
return to  the questions  raised by Hirschman and examine the
reasons why it is necessary that ethnic conflicts be examined in
relation to the forms of institutional mediation. 
2. What Is Institutions’ Polarisation in Ethnic Conflicts?
Observing very different phenomena, Geertz (1985) expressed
deep  concern  with  regard  to  institutions’  difficulty  with
asserting social ties. As a result of the formation and protection
of collective identities, Geertz (1999: 10) perceives the world to
have  become  fragmented  or  torn  to  pieces  due  to  the
multiplication  of  ethnic  and  religious  conflicts;  ‘a  world  in
pieces,’ encourages circumscribed, intensely specific, intensely
felt public identities that simultaneously fracture, in their turn,
the received forms of political order that attempt to contain them
—the currently most notable form being the  nation state. The
projection of religiously defined groupings and loyalties onto all
aspects  of  collective  life  from the  family  and neighbourhood
outward (Giorgi & Itçaina, 2016) is thus involved in a general
movement quite notably larger than itself: ‘the replacement of a
world tiled with a few very large, ill-fitting, analogous blocks by
one tiled,  no more evenly and no less completely,  with many
smaller, more diversified, more irregular ones’. Forms of ethnic
conflict  are  characterised as clashes between groups or world
conceptions  that  present  themselves  as  totalising  cultural
universes in the hope of carving out their own specific identities.
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2.1 Polarisation as Explanans of Ethnic Conflicts
Aside from Geertz, however, an entire field of study seems to
have  been  sketched  out  that  (1)  automatically  qualifies
contention  as  ‘ethnic’  without  questioning  how  and  why
conflicts  become  ethnic  (Wimmer,  2013)  and  (2)  focuses  its
attention upon ethnic conflicts, taking the concept of identity as
a starting point without considering state re-composition logic
(King, et al., 2017).
The first reason for considering identity as a starting point is
that the action of conflict reveals social belonging. In the same
direction, while reconstructing the process of ideology decline,
Bell (1960) indicates clear evidence regarding the tendency to
recover  ethnic  identities  and  the  importance  of  identity  as  a
factor  that  structures  collective  behaviour.  According  to  this
view,  it  is  the  tendency to  make  tribal,  religious,  or  national
identities  absolute  that  provokes  relentless  massacres  and
apparently insurmountable conflicts.  For this reason, it should
be necessary to acknowledge that ‘inevitably, there are cultures
which  are  incompatible  with  one  another:  cultures  of  the
dogmatic and integralist type will never be capable of finding a
ground for conciliation with those cultures which are aware of
their relativist nature’ (Crespi, 1996: 267). This is the thesis of
‘incommensurability’ and ‘untranslatability’ (Benhaibib, 2002),
centred upon a holistic  and essentialist  vision of cultures that
assumes cultures constitute totalities that are clearly describable,
that  a  relation  of  correspondence  exists  between cultures  and
population  groups,  and  that  it  is  possible  to  execute  an
indisputable description of a group’s culture; thus, there exists
no room for analysing the role of public administration in these
contentious dynamics.
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Many dynamics of conflict at the urban level are additionally
interpreted  in  this  direction.  Such  dynamics  are  described  as
ethnic conflicts between natives and immigrants wherein certain
authors attempt to analyse how ethnic and cultural diversity in
urban  societies  translate  into  contentious  politics.  The
international  literature  on  this  topic  is  extremely  vast  and
provides an accurate indication of the spread of ethnic conflicts
wherein citizens come to oppose an absolute  and indomitable
enemy identified as a foreigner. From this may be derived not
only the mobilisation of citizens  through the so-called district
councils,  but  also  the  self-segregation  of  the more  well-to-do
classes who are prone to reside in protected and separated places
(Cousin & Naudet, 2018; Andreotti, et al., 2018). 
Some authors studying ethnic conflict  as a dispute between
social  movements  have  also  assigned  the  concept  of  identity
central importance; for instance, the recent studies conducted by
Oberschall  (1994)  are  emblematic.  Identity  upholds  all  four
dimensions  through which collective  action may be analysed:
(1) discontent and grievances, (2) beliefs and ideologies, (3) the
capacity  to  act  collectively  (mobilisation),  and  (4)  political
opportunity structures (Vitale, 2015). For this reason, ‘identity is
a central  organizing concept of ethnicity’  (Oberschall & Kim,
1996:  67)  that  allows  us  to  explain  polarisation  in  ethnic
conflicts; given that individuals wish to pursue the fulfilment of
their  own  identity,  it  is  possible  to  calculate  their  ‘identity-
producing  function’  (ibidem)  and  estimate  the  outcomes  of
polarisation in an ethnic conflict  by applying a formal model.
We may—to a certain extent—consider that, in this approach,
ethnic  conflict  is  explicitly  characterised  as  a  ‘normative
conflict’. According to Kaufmann (1998: 85): 
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Normative conflicts are defined as those conflicts in which
there is a question not only of conflicting interests but also of
conflicting ‘principles’  that  permit  no compromise and the
pursuit  of  which  may  outlive  any  possible  defeats  in  the
process of political decision making or judicial scrutiny. At
the  root  of  normative  conflicts  lie  different  values  and,
arising from this, different evaluations of the situation, which
prevent  the  rivals  from recognising one another’s  point  of
view.  Normative  conflicts  are  therefore  insoluble  in
principle: direct confrontation may lead at best to their being
avoided, defused, mitigated by a third party, or suppressed,
but never to their being solved. 
Normative  conflicts  are  disputes  emerging  in  a  scenario  of
fragmentation and division wherein each party acts within the
public  sphere  and  along  the  lines  of  a  defensive  logic  with
respect  to  each  possible  ‘contamination’.  Given  these
conditions,  conflicts  take on cultural  and symbolic  forms and
content and thus clash with the field of identities, bringing into
play values that appear incompatible and non-negotiable. 
Thus,  normative  nature—displayed  by  ethnic  conflicts  in
various  authors’  conceptualisations  of  this  first  approach
(polarisation as explanans of ethnic conflicts)—is derived from
a conflict’s  causes.  When searching for a conflict’s  potential,
the important consideration in this approach involves discussing
both  where this  potential  resides—in  the  economic  structure,
socioeconomic  structure,  the  fabric  of  relations,  culture,
infrapsychic tensions, or the social groups’ inner characteristics,
among other areas—and the weight acquired by the normative
dimension in this regard.
In  this  approach,  it  is  the  actors’  normative  positions and
absolute  normative  structures  that  make conflict  both ‘ethnic’
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and  ‘normative’;  in  this  sense,  it  is  the  presence  of  identity-
producing  actors  which,  within  the  dynamics  of  a  conflict,
makes the greatest reference to rules and values. The positions’
normativity  within  each  party  involved  is  the  cause  of  the
conflict’s  nature  that,  for  this  very reason,  can be  considered
normative: the conflict’s actors and object are taken as data. In
this sense, the polarisation of identities is the  explanans of the
conflict that thereby explains its very nature. Actors dispute over
their  values  from  irreconcilable  positions,  and  for  this  very
reason, they dispute over conflicting interests.  In this body of
literature, such disputes are shown to inevitably develop in such
a way wherein what  happens is  nothing more  than what  was
predicted.  In  this  way,  any  autonomous  driving  force  of  the
conflict’s  dynamics is  denied,  which is  also the same for  the
public administration’s constituent role in terms of contentious
change. 
Therefore,  the  only  element  that  seems  to  be  assigned  any
importance is ‘what came first’—an approach that is developed
by ‘attaching’ the social actors to a cultural identity or assigning
the agents a position within the social space. Everything would
thus  depend  upon  the  relations  existing  before  the  conflict,
whilst nothing unexpected would occur within the conflict itself.
In  this  sense,  the  literature  defers  or  disregards  the  action’s
uncertain nature in the contentious dynamics and considers both
the actors and their motives data items. 
On  the  theoretical  level,  this  first  approach  limits  the
importance of contentious processes’ micro foundations, which
would otherwise require close observation of the relevant action
in  order  to  explain  its  developments  both  in  terms  of  the
strategic  action’s  unexpected  consequences  and  in  terms  of
learning in the case of radical uncertainty (see also Jobin, 2013).
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In this sense, the normative dimension becomes a single causal
factor that determines the action, whilst the individual loses his
or her ability to act rationally alongside his or her capacity to
confront  contradictions  and moral  dilemmas.  Worded  another
way, this approach offers no room for explaining what happens
in relational terms and denies the fact that interaction embraces a
dense set of robust generative mechanisms.
The  expression  ‘ethnic  conflict’  thus  runs  the  risk  of
becoming ‘a kind of shortcut term used to refer to any type of
conflict among individuals living in the same country’ (Bowen,
1996: 3), thus considering at least three assumptions valid that
are far from having been proven: (1) ethnic identities are ancient
and  immutable,  (2)  these  identities  provide  motives  for
persecution  and  murder,  and  (3)  ethnic  diversity  per  se,
inevitably gives rise to violence. However, as Donald Horowitz
(1985:  684)  writes:  ‘there  are  recurrent  tendencies  to  ethnic
cleavage and identifiable patterns of conflict, but the outcomes
of conflicts  are various rather  than uniform. […] Even in the
most  severely  divided  society,  ties  of  blood  do  not  lead
ineluctably to rivers of blood’. 
Therefore,  the  inherent  risk  of  this  first  approach  involves
considering  ethnic  conflicts  as  ‘aut-aut’  conflicts  wherein  the
object  at  stake  is  indivisible—a  type  of  conflict  that  is
completely opposed to the ‘more-less’ conflicts in which room
for negotiation exists. As Hirschman (1995) notes:
Ultimately, we should learn something from the sad outcome
of the previous attempt to distinguish between constructive
and destructive conflicts […]. I suspect, for example, that the
category  of  non-negotiable  ‘aut-aut’  conflicts  mainly
constitutes a convenient label for a wide range of new and
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unfamiliar  problems,  presenting  various  degrees  of
manageability.
Hirschman’s position is certainly not an irenic one; he does
not share the viewpoints of a certain naïve sociology that affirm
conflicts always reach positive outcomes in spite of any other
factors and that such conflicts produce integration and recognise
a  common  normative  territory.  Conflicts  may  lead  to  social
laceration; this, however, is an outcome, and one should try to
understand  if  and  how  outcomes  emerge.  For  this  reason,
Hirschman (1995: 141) criticises authors such as Helmu Dubiel
(1990) and Marcel  Gauchet (1980) for their  insistence on the
positive virtues of conflict ‘without going on to closely examine
the conditions on the basis of which the paradox of conflict, and
the  crisis  which  subsequently  engenders  progress,  can
effectively present  itself’.  Hirschman (1995:  116–117) clearly
acknowledges that conflict is, historically speaking, an ‘effective
creator  of  integration  and  cohesion’,  but  nevertheless
disapproves  of  the  fact  that,  rather  than being considered  the
outcomes  of  a  delicate  institutional  mediation  process,  the
conflict’s  positive  virtues  are  conceptualised  as  a  constantly
effective role or spontaneous mechanism: ‘their paradoxical and
miraculous  process  has  a  lot  in  common  with  Adam Smith'’
theory of the ‘invisible hand’ (ibidem: 142). 
2.2. Polarisation as Explanandum of Ethnic Conflicts
The approach just presented is certainly not the only one used
in sociology to account for the possibly tragic outcomes from
tearing  up  social  bonds  in  conflicts.  Another  approach  is
possible  to  pick up on a  conflict’s  normative  production  and
thus  on  the  role  the  state  plays  to  influence  the  dynamic  of
contention and the effects of exclusion. In this second approach,
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conflict is conceptualised as a generative process—that is to say,
in  conflict,  ‘something  happens’.  Thus,  the  normative
polarisation we saw conceptualised in the previous approach as
a cause of conflict  is now considered,  on the contrary,  as the
result of  the  conflictual  processes:  social  laceration  and
polarisation  occur  where  ethnic  conflicts,  from  a  normative
viewpoint,  do  not  generate  institutions  or  mediation.2 In  this
sense, conflict is not ‘normative’  a priori in the sense defined
above; it may become normative, yet the outcome of the conflict
is exactly what needs to be explained (this being precisely the
explanandum). Similarly, conflict is not ‘ethnic’ a priori; rather,
the fact that conflict is qualified as ethnic is something at stake
in the contentious dynamics, and actors can push or pull into this
or another qualification (Stavo-Debauge, 2005). 
The underlying hypothesis in the second approach is therefore
the idea that the characteristics of an emerging conflict depend
upon  its  dynamics  and  that  these  dynamics  explain  those
characteristics—in other words, the conflict is  explanans of its
normative production.
As a matter of fact, we owe to Simmel the idea that conflicts
should be studied as  configurations within their own dynamics
that, as such, always possess institutional dimensions that should
be observed, for the only way to understand whether the issue
that  generates  conflict  allows  association  or  gives  rise  to  the
tearing  of  social  bonds  is  to  examine  the  way  in  which
‘objectification’ occurs. Simmel uses the term streit (struggle) to
refer to a form of interaction (wechselwirkung) that is of interest
to him due to its intrinsic dynamism. He draws attention to the
2As an example,  this  approach  takes  into account  the fact  that  murderous
ethnic  cleansing is  rarely initially intended by the  perpetrators;  see  Mann
(2005: 503).
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importance of a conflict’s normative production and connection
with  the  formation  (or  rupture)  of  social  ties.  Society  is
populated by constant tensions among ‘attracting and repelling
forces’  that  are  not  only natural  to  social  life,  but  essentially
allow society to be built.3 Simmel’s intuition is that conflicts can
act  upon separative factors to avoid the polarisation of social
groups. By this perspective, conflict may become a ‘reparative
movement  against  dualism’  that  transforms  antagonistic
elements into social ties. Furthermore, social ties are created via
the recognition of a third party standing outside the conflict and
mediating  within  its  dynamics.4 This  normative  third  party—
that is, the institutional dimension—presumes the existence of a
consistency  in  the  common  rules.  More  specifically,  whilst
submitting to the ‘control’ of common rules, the rivals allow that
the  same  rules  be  adapted  to  new  situations  and  that  their
legitimacy be renewed.
There  exist  two  reasons  why  a  normative  production  may
emerge from a conflict. Firstly, if awareness of values and rules
is  raised  and  the  different  parties  thus  integrate  and  become
accustomed to recognising a common reference to a normative
universe,  ‘people  unite  in  a  common  struggle,  and  struggle
under  rules  and  norms  recognised  by  both  parties’  (Simmel,
1908: 228). Secondly, a normative production may emerge if the
parties  involved in  the  conflict  acknowledge that,  in  order  to
reach a solution, it is necessary that they execute objectification
3‘Society takes shape as a result of both types of action’ (Simmel, 1908: 215).
4Pizzorno  (2000)  clarifies  the  analytical  meaning  of  the  concept  of
recognition—a  meaning  that  brings  together  both  possible  acceptations:
recognition as a ‘condition of possibility’  for individual action and for an
individual’s aims to be formed in society, and recognition as ‘motivation of
status’—that is, the motivation to be included in a respected circle.
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actions and norms production.5 During the course of a conflict,
each party establishes norms and follows the rules that already
exist—a fact that allows ‘the bilateral acknowledgment that the
decision [favouring whoever should solve the conflict]  should
only derive from the objective weight of the motives’ (Simmel,
1908: 230); consequently, individuals and groups become aware
of a normative dimension’s presence and simultaneously sense
the  practical  possibility  of  intervening  therein.  The struggle’s
unifying force is therefore linked to processes of objectification,
whether this involve the modes of conflict (objective common
rules;  e.g.,  laws),  the modes of whatever  is  at  stake (i.e.,  the
‘ethnic’ qualification), or the modes of the conflict’s objectives. 
Nevertheless, as Simmel observes, conflict can play a positive
role  as  a  constructive  factor  of  social  ties  exclusively  in  the
presence of certain conditions. According to Simmel, types of
conflict additionally exist that favour the disintegration of social
ties. On one hand, the complexity and diverse nature of social
organisation may render societies ‘rigid’—that is, incapable of
tolerating conflict or valuing the normative knowledge conflict
creates—while on the other hand, the plurality of conflicts in a
society and the interdependence among the rivals constitute the
major factor that prevents dissolution outcomes. If multiple axes
of  conflict  cross  societies,  it  is  unlikely  that  destructive
polarisations  will  arise.  In  this  case,  individuals  join  together
and  enter  into  confrontation  depending  upon  the  object  of
conflict,  where  they  subsequently  develop  different  senses  of
belonging in a procedural fashion and multiply the links among
those  senses.  A normative  third party ‘forces  the  building  of
5According to Pizzorno (1993: 193), Simmel’s view of conflict as a generator
of rules is reminiscent of the concept of institutional innovation employed by
Machiavelli. 
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bridges’, and individuals can thus play on their own multiple,
interrelated  partisanships  frivolously and erratically  regardless
of  their  differing  social  statuses  and  ‘ethnic’  origins.  On  the
contrary,  where the axes of conflict tend to decrease, overlap,
and coincide,  the great danger arises in that conflict  develops
strong and  constant  partisanships,  links  based  on ‘similarity’,
and ‘essential equalities’.6 Individuals become ‘total persons’ in
that everything about an individual can be predicted based on a
single  detail,  and  conflict  releases  an  individual’s  entire
potential for fragmenting social ties.7 
After  Simmel,  many  sociologists  have  looked  at  rules  and
identities emerging from a conflict’s dynamics. In Europe, the
religious  wars  following  the  Protestant  Reformation  were
6According to Simmel and Coser, in 1957, Dahrendorf considered the need to
create  regulations  capable  of  allowing  conflicts  to  manifest  themselves
without ‘overlapping each other’. In  the same direction, Colin Crouch and
Alessandro Pizzorno believe that the institutionalization of conflict ‘consists
in the isolation of conflicts from one another thanks to institutional structures,
ensuring that conflicts do not feed each other and creating a state of civil war
where control is entirely absent’ (Crouch, 1999: 23). 
7In  addition,  Simmel  introduces  a  vital  distinction  between  individual
interests  and  collective  interests  by  explaining  the  degrees  of  brutality
detectable in a conflict. In the case where individual human beings fight for a
supra-individual  cause,  stimulated  by  a  collective  interest,  a
depersonalization effect is produced (as we have observed above). However,
Simmel maintains that, in the dynamics of conflicts brought about by ideals
extending beyond the individual, collective objectives remove the personal
element from the struggle, thus producing a depersonalization of the conflict
itself.  By  virtue,  conflict  occurs  of  the  objectification  of  reasons  into  a
collective ‘cause’ that, with respect  to those fighting, remains external and
allows  the  very  struggle  to  inflict  all  its  harshness  and  cruelty  without
affecting  respect  for  the  adversary,  thereby  favoring  the  recognition  of
belonging to a common humanity. 
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contained  alongside  peace  in  Westphalia  through  the  well-
known principle of cuius regio eius religio. Today, on the other
hand,  normative  conflicts  cannot  exclusively  be dealt  with by
coercively  imposing  the  normative  order  of  one’s  own
‘sovereign ruler’ upon a territory’s residents without  leaving a
margin such that groups may return to other hierarchies. On this
point,  Peter  Berger  (1998)  highlights  the  close  relationship
linking the pluralism of values and beliefs to the modernisation
process.  Modernisation  hindered  the  project  of  building  a
unified system of rules shared by the majority of the population
and simultaneously raised pluralism itself to a normative point
of reference—to an ideal of civil cohabitation among individuals
possessing differing values and beliefs. On the other hand, the
pluralism  achieved  in  everyday  ‘multicultural’  societies  is
inextricably linked to effects of the particularistic fragmentation
of  partisanships  and  collective  identities  as  well  as  to  the
consequent phenomenon of community closure among exclusive
identity  groups  governed  by  forms  of  ‘community
totalitarianism’. 
One additional reference is Ralph H. Turner’s emergent norm
theory (1996). This theory draws attention to a specific manner
of  coordinated  action  and  is  founded  upon  three  ideas:  the
emergent norm, the key motive (or keynoting), and the situation
definition.  Regardless  of how well-organised collective  action
may  be,  the  collective  behaviour’s  central  activity  is  the
redefinition  of  the  situation,  thus  facilitating  avoidance  of
‘normative  confusion’  and  the  emergence  of  normative
innovation.The main assumption of Turner’s theory is that the
majority of those taking part in any intense collective behaviour
experience  a  normative  pressure  that  does  not  need  to  be
internalised.  The  emergent  norm  theory  identifies  the
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circumstances wherein a normative production arises within a
collective action in relation to a principle of dependence upon
risks—that  is,  when the sense of an acceptable  risk suddenly
changes.  In  Turner’s  theory,  emergent  social  norms
simultaneously  possess  a  cognitive  and  emotional  dimension
and  thus  include  both  moral  sentiment  and  ethical  beliefs.
Turner (1996: 9) states it in general terms: 
Emergent  norms  arise,  provided  other  conditions  are
conducive,  when  the  sense  of  normally  acceptable  risk  is
greatly intensified or greatly diminished. If it is intensified,
the  emergent  norm will  either  define  previously  tolerable
conditions as intolerable or call for a harsher, more prompt,
or surer imposition of negative sanctions upon the deviant(s),
or both. If the sense of risk is diminished, the emergent norm
will  pronounce  previously  proscribed  behaviour  as
acceptable.
Given this picture, it is possible to consider the full meaning
of  the  assertions  made  in  recent  research  concerning  ethnic
conflicts; these assertions demonstrate how those taking part in a
conflict  follow  a  rhetorical  strategy  in  an  attempt  to  reduce
relations’ multidimensionality by making one dimension appear
entirely important. The most extreme strategy is the perpetration
of atrocities to polarise relations (Banton, 2000: 496).
In this sense, Ruane and Todd (2004: 227) propose a way of
explaining the persistence of solidarity,  ethnic opposition,  and
ethnic conflict ‘without hypostatizing ethnic groups or treating
ethnic  bonds  as  foundational’.  Consequently,  ethnic  conflict
cannot be considered a social form, which is different than other
types of conflict: ‘ethnic conflict thus remains on a continuum
with  other  types  of  conflict,  rather  than  being  qualitatively
distinct  from them’  (ibidem).  Along  the  same  lines,  as  John
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Bowen  (1996)  highlights,  the  acceptance  of  negative
stereotypes, the fear of another group, and the motto ‘kill before
you  are  killed’—far  from  being  ‘ethnic  tensions  of  the
permanent  type’—are the products of both a political  process
and conflictual trend that can be produced just as quickly as they
can be erased (Claverie, 2004). 
Additionally  in  Wimmer’s  (2013) work on ethnic boundary
making, actors and motives are activated by the conflict and not
by  their  partisan  belongings,  whilst  normativity  is  no  longer
related to the causes of the conflict but, on the other hand, is an
effect  arising  from  the  dynamics  of  any  conflict  between
unequal  parties  over  power  and  resources.  The  ‘ethnic’
qualification  is  also  not  a  starting  point,  but  rather  a  way to
specify  the  contention  during  its  dynamic  in  this  sense,  thus
eliminating any normative conflicts or conflicts of interest. This
distinction fails because, in conflictual processes,  combinations
of desires and interests are always at play, while in a Weberian
sense,  actions  are  at  once  based on rules  and interests.  Each
combination depends upon the kind of interaction in a specific,
empirical dynamic  of contention wherein the state (its agency
and  choices)  plays  a  relevant  role  (Olzak,  1992;  but  for
comparative  empirical  analysis  at  the  urban  level,  see
Cremaschi, Le Galès, 2018).
3. Conflict Data on Roma Settlements in Italy: Metropolitan 
Areas
In Milan and Rome, municipal administrations tried to make
the  presence  of  Roma  and  Sinti  groups—whether  they  be
composed by Italian citizens or by new immigrants—even less
visible than in other towns. In the research we performed on the
choices  executed by the municipalities of Milan (centre-right)
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and  Rome  (centre-left)  between  2003  and  20078,  a  quite
homogeneous picture of local policies surfaced (Vitale, 2008),
defined by ten main traits:
1. The reifying usage of the category ‘nomads’ that flattens
a  very  heterogeneous  ‘minorities  galaxy’  into  a
homogeneous identity (see also Sigona, 2003);
2. An  ethnic  connotation  that  clearly  splits  these  groups
from the rest of the population (on the moral level,  as
well, see Acton, 2016; Kóczé & Rövid, 2017; Mayer et
al., 2018; Mc Garry, 2017; Pasta & Vitale, 2018; Picker
& Roccheggiani, 2014; Powell, & Lever, 2017; Tremlett
et al., 2017;).
3. The  negation  of  any  exchange  and  negotiation
possibility;  in  other  words,  the  failure  to  recognise  a
legitimate representation (Vitale & Boschetti, 2011);
4. A  continual  curtailment  of  the  variety  of  used  public
action instruments (see also Hansson & Mitchell, 2018);
5. The overall fatalism characterising public action on the
issue (see also Beluschi-Fabeni, et al., 2018);
6. A strong spatial segregation in the intended housing (see
also Aguilera & Vitale, 2016);
7. A different administrative treatment regarding residential
construction  and  urban  standards  (see  also  Manzoni,
2018);
8. The production of unhealthy conditions that jeopardise
health and tragically lower life expectancy9;
8For  updates  about  local  policies  towards  Roma in  Milan  and  Rome,  see
Maestri & Vitale (2017); Armillei (2018); Daniele et al. (2018); Pasta et al.
(2019). 
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9. The  cyclical  resort  to  the  device  of  evacuation,  used
without proposing alternatives (see also Cousin, Legros,
2014);
10. The splitting of partners and the separation of children
from their parents during housing emergencies (Daniele,
et al., 2018).
This  public  policy  scheme  poses  relevant  political
consequences driven by a demagogic style  towards consensus
building  and  a  minimalist  reduction  of  Roma  rights  defence
organisations’ expectations (see also Lièvre, 2014).
The problem with these policies is not merely their incapacity
to attack issues, advance social harmony, or provide collective
endowments  useful  for  promoting  and  protecting  every
individual, including the weakest; rather, the point is that these
policies  move  along  consensus-building  logics  that  possess  a
very strong generative effect  on instrument  selection  methods
(Lascoumes & Le Galès,  2007b),  local  policy implementation
practices,  metropolitan  internal  competition  (Galimberti,  Pin,
2016;  Del Fabbro,  2017) and public  opinion dynamics  whose
stereotypes they bolster (see also Morales & Castelli Gattinara,
2017).  Therefore,  we  shall  more  precisely  determine  the
assumptions of this demagogic model with the following items.
a) The first assumption is generic although no less important;
it  is  the  idea  that  social  policies  do  not  draw  electoral
consensuses.
b)  Keeping  issues  open  and  fuelling  them  is  typical  for
demagogic strategies to perpetuate the sources of inconvenience
that facilitate  token actions aiming to obtain the consensus of
one side.
9To go beyond the model and see how it is effective to interpret empirical
cases, see Rosa (2018).
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c)  The  assumption  takes  for  granted  that  consensuses  may
only  be  built  through  initiatives  whose  happiness  conditions
exclusively occur on a considerably short term or are even better
‘now’—that is, through actions whose success is determined by
the simple fact that they are performed and not assessed by their
consequences.
d) A naturalised principle states that a consensus is obtained
through public  media  that  justifies  actions  on  the  grounds of
binary  and  Manichaean  logic  with  no  structure  upon  a
continuum.
e)  Such  a  principle  deems  that  simple  and  unique
interventions that lower the range of arranged and used public
action tools favour the obtainment of positive feedback because
such feedback is more easily sold to the media.
f) The following idea is a corollary to what was previously
exposed;  individual  politicians  can  improve  their  reputations
more easily through their physical presence in places of hardship
rather than through the enactment of poorly visible yet effective
or resolving interventions.
These  ten  logics  are  not  demonstrated,  and no feedback of
evidence states that following them to the letter is the only way
to reach a consensus for a local policy regarding Roma and Sinti
groups.  These assumptions  are  widely adopted by part  of the
local political class. To be more precise, they form a prevailing
ideology with the meaning given by Luc Boltanski and Pierre
Bourdieu (2008) in that they are widely implicit schemes likely
to  generate  masses  of  colloquial,  rhetorical  productions  and
practices tuned to various situations; an evidence of good sense
is assigned to these schemes, thus allowing the legitimation of
the  idea  that  the  only  effective  action  is  that  aimed  towards
following a direction predetermined by social change. In other
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words, their aim is to demonstrate that, if one wishes to perform
an action to entail change, a consensus may only be reached in
the event that these precise assumptions are accepted. Whereas
the municipal  majority  seeks  a  consensus on the basis  of  the
outlined logics, furthering those devices such as Nomad camps
(sometimes  labelled  also  as  Roma  camps)  and  evacuations
favour  an institutional  context  in  which  alliances  within  anti-
racist actors are difficult to ascertain and rarely practised; these
include both the coalitions between associations or movements
of support with trade unions and cooperation centres as well as
broader alliances with some socio-professional categories, such
as social workers, teachers, artists, lawyers, local police officers,
and journalists.
4. Data on Innovative Forms of Institutional Mediation: Small
and Middle-Sized Cities 
The  determinism  of  this  interpretative  scheme  is  nearly
asphyxiating; while important, its outlining would be improper
to  regard  as  the  only  valid  scheme  that  covers  the
comprehensive set of local policies towards ‘gypsy’  groups in
Italy. Aside from its political and moral implications, the point
is essentially cognitive.
During 2008, we performed a reconnaissance of other local
Italian policies10. The picture that appeared allowed us to upset
the above scheme and deny a single interpretation by providing
counterfactuals.
The  first  point,  the  assignment  of  a  homogeneous  identity,
remains undetermined by the instances of Trento, Rovereto, and
10On the comparative method adopted here,  and its way of dealing with a
model, to problematise and complexify it, please see Vitale & Tosi (2019);
see also Citroni (2018) and Le Galès (2018).
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Mantua and is capable of precisely recognising the difference
within the various groups in their territories. The case of Trezzo
sull’Adda is interesting in this regard because it  administered a
long social survey to become familiar with each group and each
family and subsequently listen to them.
The  second  point,  ethnic  connotation  as  a  factor  of  moral
discrimination,  is plainly undetermined by the case of Pisa in
that Roma and Sinti are neither  a priori connoted as perverse
nor inclined to exhibit illicit behaviours, while the lessons learnt
about  the  importance  of  mediation  during  the  Città  sottili
programme are applied to the remaining citizens. The universal
reach of the acquired knowledge favours institutional learning
useful  to  all  citizens.  In  Trezzo  sull’Adda,  social  services
develop their  interventions  towards Roma with no specialism,
but  rather  within  the  established—if  difficult—horizon  of
service ‘integration’ (Boisseuil, 2018).
The  third  point,  the  lack  of  representation  and  speech
capability  recognition,  is  undetermined  by  the  instance  of
Modena in  that  even the  case  study drafting  process  directly
allowed  the  Sinti  to  speak  and  build  an  ad  hoc  collective
dialogue.  Even  the  interventions  carried  out  in  Mantua,
Buccinasco, Settimo Torinese, and Padua describe the viable co-
designing paths within the direct and constant exchange between
the measures’ addressees.
The  fourth  point,  the  reduction  of  available  devices,  is
undetermined by the instance of the region-financed project of
Arci  Toscana.  The  instance  of  Bologna  heads  in  the  same
direction, as interventions for work placement and the support
for  regularising  residence  permits  were  joined  by  multiple
housing interventions backing Roma families in their ability to
enter  private  renting  markets  with  the  support  of  their
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reputational capital. Although it lacks institutional support, the
experimental project carried on by  Casa della carità in Milan
additionally follows in this  direction;  moreover,  the aim is  to
enlarge the set  of available  devices to thereby favour savings
and prevent dependence traps. 
The fifth  point,  fatalism,  is  undetermined in most  collected
cases.  Consider  the  remarks  made  by  Lucatti  on  the  social
services  she  encouraged  and  the  instances  of  Buccinasco,
Mantua,  Padua,  and  Venice  that,  in  the  aftermath  of  2007,
undertook brave  choices  during  a  period  when stopping anti-
gypsy mobilisations seemed impossible and newspapers insisted
that helping ‘gypsies’ meant losing elections11.
The  sixth  point,  the  strong  spatial  segregation,  is
undetermined  firstly  by  the  case  of  Bologna  regarding  the
placement  of  private  housing  spreading  into  various
neighbourhoods and municipalities; this segregation is secondly
undetermined due to the Padua instance wherein the micro-area
for those Sinti who wanted to live in close proximity to their
extended family was established in a non-isolated area rather the
middle of nowhere or in the middle of a motorway exit (see also
Semprebon & Vicari, 2016).
The  seventh  point,  differential  bureaucratic  treatment,  is
undetermined not only by all the collected instances of housing
policies  that  do  not  set  up  settlement  areas  unfit  for  human
habitation,  but  also  by  law-compliant  solutions  that  are
inhabitable  by  anyone,  not  only  ‘nomads’.  Social  projects  in
healthcare and education were finalised to extend the fruition of
territorial  opportunities  to  Roma and Sinti  rather  than  realise
11For a broader discussion on the links between universalism and inclusionary
policies  in  an  age  of  new  exclusionary  nationalism,  see  Crouch,  Vitale
(2019).
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separate interventions with a sole target head (Bravi, 2019) in
the direction opposite of differential treatment.
The eighth point, unhealthy conditions, is undetermined by all
programmes  that  overcome  nomad  camps  as  well  as  by
measures that improve health. One instance appears particularly
interesting  to  us,  although  we  had  to  mobilise  it  ad  hoc  by
finding it outside Italy. This instance is the extremely interesting
interventions case executed by Lyon to upgrade shanty towns
that  was judged as  a  ‘lesser  evil’  (Boltanski  & Vitale  2006).
Shanty  towns  are  certainly  evil  because  they  are  illegal  land
occupations  that  do  not  allow adequate  living  conditions  and
worsen social disadvantages. Facing this situation with the long-
term  aim  of  gradually  overcoming  it,  the  administration
committed  to  damage  reduction  by  delivering  some  minimal
services and guaranteeing a few fundamental rights (e.g., water
rights).
The ninth point, the evacuations cycle, remains undetermined
by both Tuscan and Emilian cases. The main point is not the fact
that some cities do not resort to evacuation in their repertory, but
rather  that  some local  authorities  do  not  use  evacuation  in  a
recursive, cyclical manner or for the sake of evacuation, instead
allowing  that  the  very  same  area  be  reoccupied  in  order  to
implement  another  evacuation  with  media  coverage.  On  the
contrary,  comparative  research  reveals  that  evacuations  are  a
few cities’ last resort that are organised to honour international
conventions  and  accommodate  alternative  solutions  for
everyone  without  destroying  personal  effects,  transferring  the
problem elsewhere, or postponing the process for a few days.
The tenth point, the splitting of family units during housing
emergencies,  remains  undetermined  by the  cases  of  Bologna,
Florence, and Trento, which report that it is possible to maintain
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family  units  intact  whilst  facing  housing  emergencies  by
arranging temporary shelters for whole family units rather than
for  mere  individuals  or  women  and  children  exclusively.
Moreover,  these  shelters  are  specialised  not  in  caring  for
‘gypsies’, but in caring for all people in need.
Thus,  the  relativized  scheme  reveals  its  significance  even
further; it is not only justified on the constitutional level, as it
honours European legislation and human rights, yet it is neither
justified on the political level. Fatalism continually surfaces in
statements  made  by  politicians  and  administrative  managers
who perpetuate policies founded upon extreme segregation and
periodic evacuation: ‘It is not our will, as we would like to do
otherwise, but we cannot with these ones’. Rather, the selected
cases exemplify that it is possible to do otherwise. 
Above  all,  choices  lie  at  the  basis  of  nomad  camps  and
evacuations’  policies  because  the  two  devices  work  together.
Furthering  these  policies  is  a  choice;  according  to  political
sociology, this choice is demagogic insofar as the public opinion
dynamics  are  essentially  moved  by  political  and  moral
entrepreneurs  with  no  verification  of  the  performed  policy’s
success (Prasad, 2006). Clearly, this choice is partly guided by
previous  decisions  or  procedural  routines  in  the  public
administration’s  appropriate  sectors  that  build  small-status
revenues  and tend to preserve themselves  by their  inertia  (de
Leonardis, Vitale, 2001). However, the political, electoral, and
economic costs of distancing oneself from that model are lower
than how they may initially appear. 
Finally,  the  ten-point  interpretative  scheme  that  appeared
while  studying the cases  of Milan and Rome turns  out  to be
relevant for gathering many local policies’ traits. However, the
herein  cited  cases  allow  that  the  scheme  be  de-naturalised
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because  it  holds  but  is  not  necessary;  it  holds  but  does  not
synthesise the body of empirical cases, and it holds but is not the
only scheme of enacted policies.  In other words, we used the
case  studies  to  render  the  analysis  sensible  to  contextual
elements.
4.1 Institutional Mediation and Consensus Building
The crux of the relationship between local integrated policies
for  Roma  and Sinti  as  well  as  political  consensuses  must  be
explored with great care. We observe traces of another modality
by observing  the  mechanisms  of  consensus  building  in  those
municipalities that, in recent years, attempted and implemented
integrated  policies  to  prevent  Roma  and  Sinti  exclusion.  In
Northern  Italy,  the  most  relevant  cases  include  Venice  and
Padua  in  Veneto,  Settimo  Torinese  in  Piedmont,  Buccinasco,
Bergamo, and Mantua in Lombardy.12 This sufficient number of
cases convey various magnitudes, thus allowing the recognition
of  some traits  common to  a  model  of  incremental consensus
building around one’s own actions. Surely, each municipality in
this  group  had  to  face  protests—sometimes  highly  pitched—
against  their  policies  towards  Roma  and  Sinti  groups
specifically when localising areas for housing welfare but much
less  frequently  when  regarding  education,  literacy,  and  work
placement  policies  (see also Benarrosh-Orsoni,  2011; Ciniero,
2013).
Therefore, we will abstract the main assumptions at the basis
of consensus building through the integrated policies negotiated
with Roma and Sinti.
12Other  interesting  cases  can  be  located  in  the  literature,  with  particular
reference to a few municipalities in both Tuscany (Fondazione Michelucci,
2004) and Piedmont (Franzese & Spadaio, 2005).
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1. The  first  assumption  is  that  consensus  building  is  a
process that must begin before an actual intervention; it
must  continue  during  realisation  and  after  the
intervention  has  ended,  and  the  temporal  horizon  of
consensus  building  is  longer  than  that  of  the  planned
interventions.
2. The second assumption follows the incremental ways to
build a consensus. Local administrators plan by acting in
concentric circles and creating gradual alliances—firstly
with those who are easy to involve due to their strong
sympathy  towards  the  implementation  proposals,  and
secondly  by  slowly  discussing  and  negotiating  with
interest  groups  further  away  from  the  former’s
sensibilities  and  attention  (see  also  the  conclusion  of
Biorcio & Vitale, 2016).
3. The  third  assumption  involves  the  strategical
management of communications. Herein analysed local
authorities  greatly  emphasise  small  achievements  and
results  coherent  with  planned  objectives  (see  also,
Polizzi, et al., 2013). They do not rule out resorting to
communication  tools  built  around  individual  paths  of
Roma  or  Sinti  people  interested  in  the  interventions;
thus,  the  need  for  obtaining  short-term  successes  is
satisfied  by  reporting  small  ongoing  changes  and
intentionally building the idea of an active, virtuous path.
In other words, forms of objectivity and proofs of reality
are built  (Boltanski & Thévenot,  2006) to demonstrate
and prove evidence of one’s own action by explaining its
criteria of effectiveness and efficacy.13
13With  this  meaning,  the  sought-after  legitimation  is  typical  of
communication and information devices;  it  is  thus based on both decision
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4. It is foreseen that the opposition’s dissent and protests
will be tough and capable of mobilising many citizens.
To this end, places and devices are arranged to listen to
citizens’  issues  that  are  often  not  relevant  to  the
intervention towards Roma and Sinti  groups.  Attempts
are made to discern and administer separate answers to
ordinary citizens’ needs as well  as keep distinct  issues
disjointed  (Ciniero,  2019).  Those  elected  with  local
authority and responsibility often appear where citizens
protest,  proactively  searching  for  dialogue  so  as  to
contain squabble about absence and abandonment. 
5. There  exists  a  tendency  to  pluralise  the  used  public
action  devices  to  obtain  new  funding  clearly  aimed
towards these groups, thus explaining in great detail that
the corresponding funds are  supplementary rather  than
entail  resource  reduction  among  the  population  as  a
whole.
6. One shall work on the mediation to favour the access of
Roma and Sinti  to  current  universal  services  (Olivera,
2016;  Clavé-Mercier  &  Olivera,  2018).  Without
activating dedicated and specialistic  services,  one shall
negotiate the sustainable involvement of the beneficiary
Roma and Sinti in the expense budget. One strengthens
explicitness and actor responsibility (Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2007a: 107).
However, it is worth pointing out that research regarding other public action
areas noticed a certain behaviour in those administrations that were interested
in  social  innovation  (see  Matras,  et  al.,  2018).  When  they  reflexively
understand that efficacy and effectiveness criteria—coherent with their own
action logics—do not attain adequate communication devices, they support
ad hoc initiatives that both reduce their policies’ complexity and make their
efficacy and effectiveness criteria discrete rather than continuous. For more
detailed observations, see Pasta et al. (2019).
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public communication regarding such improvements in
terms  of  recognition  adjusted  to  co-responsibility  and
activation in addition to savings with regard to previous
law and order expenses (Bonetti, et al., 2010).
These elements are in no way proffered as the ingredients of a
magic formula with the ability to obtain and reproduce political
consensuses  on  social  and  urban  policy  choices  that  support
Roma and Sinti groups. Nothing here is proposed in the sense of
blueprints for best practices or mere design principles. What is
at stake involves describing the normative frame—which always
regards what must be done—that actors express in their attempt
to  discuss  and negotiate  integrated  policies  with  citizens  (see
Bortone  &  Pistecchia,  2019).  This  does  not  automatically
implicate  a fall  in idealistic  volunteering,  as if  local,  political
decision  makers  were  able  to  accomplish  everything  they
planned and their choices were marked solely by their political
culture, their ethical conscience, and the interests to which they
answer. Decision makers face not only a balance of forces in a
given  interaction,  but  also  institutional  and  normative
constraints  that  stiffen  public  action,  judicial,  technical,  and
accounting laws, budget constraints, technical instruments, and
devices  possessing  their  own  automatisms.  What  we  have
demonstrated  reckons  the  fact  that  everything  is  not  always
negotiable, which merely implies that, in actual situations, there
is  always  room  for  action  and  manoeuvring—both  among
political  decision  makers  and  among  other  concerned  actors,
including addressees.
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5. Conflicts, Institutional Mediation, and Normative 
Production
The  contradictions  opened  by  the  Roma  and  Sinti  groups’
presence fall on local authorities who lack the adequate tools to
address them; moreover, these contradictions are rarely backed
by public authorities on higher levels. However, room for action
and degrees of freedom are present on the local level, allowing
that policies be bent in many possible directions. Public policy
choices  that  can  be  exerted  on  the  local  level  strongly
circumscribe  opportunities  of  action  regarding  primary  and
secondary education, work placement, healthcare, sociality, and,
above all,  housing. These choices can either  favour or hinder
conditions of these communities’ ‘recognition’ (Pizzorno, 2007:
275–295)  in  a  ‘necessarily  complex  and  self-contradictory’
social order (Jobert, 1998: 25).14
The  institutional  mediation  of  conflicts  against  Roma  in
Italian cities is always the result of a situated interaction game
between  various  actors  with  different  interests  and  within
common constraints (see also Le Galès, Vitale, 2015). Despite
having stressed the crucial role of policies and their instruments’
inertia (especially the ‘Nomad camp’ device, see Daniele, 2013),
it is nonetheless possible to explain the other variables important
for  understanding  and  interpreting  conflict  dynamics;  these
variables  firstly  include  those  regarding  the  behaviours  of
political  parties  and  entrepreneurs  as  well  as  the  interactions
14Reflections by Ambrosini (2008: 212) are particularly interesting from this
perspective.  It  is therein noted that, in the case of Roma, conflicts surface
within ‘territorial  mobility  practices  of  transnational  minorities  and  social
benefits still regulated by bonds of affiliation to nation states, whose result is
to dig deep inequalities within the various groups that constitute Roma and
Sinti complex’. See also Bergeon (2015) and broadly Vacca, et al. 2016. 
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between  political  entrepreneurs,  local  associations,  and  the
media  (see  Boussaguet  &  Halpern,  2018),  and  secondly,  the
stereotypes  and prejudices  that  consolidated  in  the  long term
towards Roma populations and can or cannot be activated and
mobilised in the public arena (see also Mantovan, 2016; Giorgi
& Vitale, 2017; Mantovan, 2018a).
These  interactions’  outcomes  are  unforeseeable.  The
experimental reality of Italian cities presents a certain variety of
dynamics and methods of Roma and Sinti treatment that do not
exclusively reference the scheme of eugenic roots outlined in the
paragraphs  above.  Public  action  does  not  exclusively  enact
heinously differential treatment, and government styles’ actions
are  different  than  those  that  set  various  communities  against
themselves  (mainstream  and  Romani)  in  a  standing  and
polarised  conflict  (Ciniero,  2017;  see  also  Bellè,  2015).  We
additionally  observe government  and public  action  forms  that
aim  towards  mediation  and  the  realisation  of  integrated
interventions  that  set  themselves  medium-term  deadlines  to
evaluate effectiveness and that are not crushed on short-breath
consensus objectives (de Martino, 2019; for a broader picture,
see  also  Bussu  &  Galanti,  2015;  Pais,  et  al.,  2019).  They
mobilise a rich and varied juridical culture (Mantovan, 2018b).
Above all, these forms aim to exchange and negotiate with the
Roma  themselves  through  the  representation  they  assign
themselves in autonomy, maintaining a dialogue with NGOs and
humanitarian associations too. 
To  fully  grasp  and  conceptualise  the  role  of  institutional
mediation  in  these  empirical  cases,  we  must  revisit  the
connection  between  conflicts,  mediations,  and  normative
production;  in terms of classical  sociology,  this  connection  is
what  Simmel  (1908:  255)  called  ‘problems  of  governance  of
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plurality’.  The point is that,  through this  empirical  research—
albeit restricted to ten cities in Italy—we have witnessed that the
state  is  effective  in  reducing  polarisation  when  its  forms  of
institutional mediation produce a compromise, made possible by
a  shared  judgment  on  the  object  of  dispute  and  based  on  a
common scale of equivalence that often emerges as a by-product
during the conflict and renders the disputed assets divisible.15 
Let us elaborate on this point—so to say, on the relevance of
the common scale of equivalence (Boltanski & Thévenot 2006);
through  policy  instruments,  planning  choices,  service
localisation,  and  resource  allocation,  institutional  mediation
introduces  not  merely  shared  rules  (as  a  Coser  functionalist
reading of Simmel would have underlined), but rules with stakes
recognised as mutual. Indeed, what is at stake has not merely
involved  all  rivals  in  a  political  process  or  the  coercion  of
different  groups  to  agree  on  fundamental  values.  Normative
conflicts defy the potential for mediation not quite on the basis
of  efficiency,  but  rather  on  that  of  the  mediation  processes’
quality through which social matters are designated in relation to
themes,  problems,  rules,  and  standards.  The  cases  we  have
studied  exemplify  the  relevance  of  the  pragmatic mediation
form—a non-coercive process of mediation wherein each party
pursues  a  compromise  by  relying  on  the  presence  of  a  third
party.  Our  evidence  reveals  that  the  possibility  of  translating
individual  interests  into  a  collective  interest  is  no  longer  a
question  of  objectifying  the  conflict  and  producing  the
15As Simmel  (1908:  255)  points  out:  ‘for  certain  objects,  compromise  by
division is  out  of  the question.  [...]  Nevertheless,  struggles  for  indivisible
objects  are  susceptible  of  reaching  a  compromise  when  these  objects  are
substitutable’.  See  also  the  concept  of  compromise  as  elaborated  by both
Boltanski and Thévenot (2005) as well as Vitale, 2007 and Vitale & Podestà
(2011).
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acceptance  of  common  rules,  but  rather  introducing  flexible
normative structures and assigning greater value to each party’s
capacity for self-expression—precisely on the regulation issue
of how resources should be allocated and how the delivery of
collective goods should be coordinated at the very local level.
Our  research’s  main  theoretical  results  have  illustrated  the
central  role  that  both  groupings  of  objects,  rules,  and
‘conventions’ (Borghi, Vitale, 2007) with a performative power
as  law as  well  as  public  policy instrumentation  play in  these
conflicts’ dynamics. This role does not maintain that actors do
not possess normative competences or their own value derived
from socialisation and driven exclusively by external dynamics;
indeed, considering how these normative competences emerge
along  a  conflict’s  dynamic,  it  may  be  useful  to  understand
through  what  kinds  of  processes  ethnic  cleansings  become
accepted by perpetrators as ‘moral murders’ when no antecedent
streams of violence and socialisation co-occur. 
Each conflict  is unique, and thus any resolution is likely to
depend upon particular institutions (Persico, 2015), contentious
processes,  and time-specific  circumstances  (Banton,  2000).  In
order  to  study  the  state’s  role  in  structuring  extreme  ethnic
exclusion,  we  have  reconstructed  this  conflict’s  dynamic  by
analysing  the  sequence  of  interactions,  paying  particular
attention to if and how legitimate mediation mechanisms actors
commonly recognise or  accept  emerge  within each individual
conflict’s  dynamics  or  if,  on  the  other  hand,  polarisation
outcomes arise because both the normative devices are incapable
of linking the various  parties  and the state’s  exercising of its
sovereignty  has  been  factionalised.  Along  the  same  lines,
polarisation  has  been  defined  as  the  outcome  of  a  failure  to
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produce  normative  devices  capable  of  reaching  a  stable
compromise among all parties involved in a particular situation.
Bibliografia
1. Acton  T.A.,  2016,  “Scientific  Racism,  Popular  Racism  and  the
Discourse of the Gypsy Lore Society”, Ethnic and Racial Studies 39
(7), pp. 1187–1204.
2. Aguilera T., Vitale T., 2016, “Baraccopoli europee:le responsabilità
delle politiche pubbliche”,  Aggiornamenti Sociali 67 (2), pp. 111-
119.
3. Ambrosini  M.,  2008,  “La  sfida  più  ardua:  costruire  politiche  di
integrazione per (e con) le minoranze rom e sinte”, in Osservatorio
Regionale  per  l’integrazione  e  la  multietnicità,  Gli  immigrati  in
Lombardia. Rapporto 2007, Milano, Fondazione Ismu.
4. Andreotti  A.,  Le  Galès  P.,  Moreno-Fuentes  F.J.,  2018,  “The
challenge  of  researching  “partial  exit”  and  “rootedness”  among
upper-middle classes in European cities”,  Urban geography,  DOI:
10.1080/02723638.2018.1472443. 
5. Armillei R., 2018, The “Camps System” in Italy, London, Palgrave
Macmillan.
6. Banton M., 2000, “Ethnic Conflict”, in  Sociology, 34 (3), pp.481–
498.
7. Bell D., 1960, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political
Ideas in the Fifties, Glencoe, The free press of Glencoe.
8. Bellè  E.,  2015,  “From  territory  to  community.  Inside  the  «black
box»  of  Northern  League’s  populism”,  Etnografia  e  Ricerca
Qualitativa 1, pp. 87-106. 
9. Beluschi-Fabeni  G.,  Viktor Leggio  D.,  Matras  Y.,  2018, “A Lost
Generation? Racialization and Stalled Social Mobility in a Group of
62
Conflicts on Roma Settlements in Italian Cities: Normative Polarisation and 
Pragmatic Mediation 
Roma  Migrants  in  the  UK.”,  Migration  Studies on  line  first.
doi:10.1093/migration/mny003.
10. Benarrosh-Orsoni  N.,  2011,  “Bricoler  l’hospitalité  publique:
réflexions autour du relogement des Roms roumains à Montreuil”,
Géocarrefour, 86 (1), pp. 55-65. 
11. Bergeon C., 2015, “La Méditerranée comme carrefour des mobilités
des migrants roms”, Confluences Méditerranée, 93, pp. 39-50.
12. Berger  P.L.  (ed.),  1998,  The Limits of  Social  Cohesion,  Boulder-
Oxford, WestviewPress. 
13. Biorcio R., Vitale T., Italia civile. Associazionismo, partecipazione
e politica, Roma, Donzelli.
14. Boisseuil C., 2019, “Governing ambiguity and implementing cross-
sectoral  programmes:  urban regeneration for social mix in Paris”,
Journal of Housing and the Built Environment First online, p. 1-16. 
15. Boltanski  L.,  Bourdieu  P.,  2008,  La  production  de  l’idéologie
dominante, Paris, Demopolis.
16. Boltanski L., Thévenot L., 2006, On Justification. The Economies of
Worth, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
17. Boltanski  L.,  Vitale  T.,  2006,  “Una  sociologia  politica  e  morale
delle  contraddizioni”,  Rassegna Italiana di  Sociologia 46 (1),  pp.
91-116.
18. Bonetti P., Simoni A., Vitale T., 2010,  La condizione giuridica di
Rom e Sinti in Italia, Milano, Giuffrè.
19. Borghi  V.,  Vitale  T.,  2007,  Le convenzioni  del  lavoro,  il  lavoro
delle convenzioni, Milano, FrancoAngeli.
20. Bortone R., Pistecchia A., 2019, “Il dibattito sul riconoscimento di
Rom, Sinti e Caminanti come minoranza e la Strategia Nazionale di
Inclusione”, Palaver, 8 (1), pp. 205-226.
63
Tommaso Vitale
21. Bossaguet  L.,  Halpern  C.,  2018, “NGOs,  civil  society and policy
analysis:  From  mutual  disinterest  to  reciprocal  investment”,  in
Halpern C., Hassentefeufel P., Zittoun P. (eds),  Policy analysis in
France. Bristol: Policy Press, pp. 243-260. 
22. Bowen J. R., 1996, “The Myth of Global Ethnic Conflict”, Journal
of Democracy, 7 (4), pp. 3-14.
23. Bravi L.,  2019, “Rieducare i rom e sinti tra passato e presente.  Il
genocidio e l’etnocidio culturale”, Palaver 8 (1), pp. 75-101.
24. Bussu S., Galanti M.T., 2015, “Local governments at the time of the
crisis”,  Italian  Politics:  The  Year  of  the  Bulldozer,  30,  London,
Berghahn Books, pp. 141–159. 
25. Ciniero  A.,  2013,  “I  rom  del  Campo  Panareo  di  Lecce  tra
marginalità  socio-lavorativa  e  contingenza”,  in  Dada.  Rivista  di
antropologia post-globale 3 (2), pp. 111-134.
26. Ciniero  A.,  2017,  “Mascarimirì,  come  legge!  percorsi  scolastici,
identità  e  rielaborazione  delle  appartenenze  culturali  nel  racconto
intergenerazionale di una famiglia rom dell’Italia meridionale. Note
su un’indagine in corso”,  Rivista di Storia dell‘Educazione, 4 (1),
pp. 31-49.
27. Ciniero  A.,  2019,Analisi  dei  processi  di  esclusione/inclusione
sociale dei gruppi rom. Un caso studio, Palaver 8 (1), pp. 103-155.
28. Citroni  S.,  2018,  “Social  spirals  through  everyday  group  life:
settings and group styles in a comparative perspective”, Frontiers in
Sociology- Sociological Theory, 2, pp. 1-10.
29. Clavé-Mercier  A.,  Olivera  M.,  2018,  “Inclusion  and  the  ‘Arts  of
Resistance.’”,  Intersections. East European Journal of Society and
Politics 4 (2), pp. 149–68.
30. Claverie E., 2004, “Techniques de la menace”, Terrain, 43, pp. 72-
89. 
64
Conflicts on Roma Settlements in Italian Cities: Normative Polarisation and 
Pragmatic Mediation 
31. Coser L. (1956),  The functions of social conflict, Glencoe, IL: The
Free Press.
32. Cousin B., Naudet J., 2018, “Entre-soi élitaire et communautarisme
de classe (Paris,  Delhi,  Sao Paulo)”,  in Mohammed M., Talpin J.
(eds).  Communautarisme ? Paris, Presses Universitaires de France,
pp. 55-68.
33. Cousin  G.,  Legros  O.,  2014,  “Gouverner  par  l’évacuation?
L’exemple des campements illicites en Seine-Saint-Denis”, Annales
de Géographie, 6(700), pp. 1262-1284. 
34. Cremaschi  M.,  Le  Galès  P.,  2018,  “Tra  tipi  e  forme.  Perché  la
sociologia urbana deve lavorare sulle dinamiche”, Rassegna italiana
di sociologia 4, pp. 761-788. 
35. Crespi F., 1996, Manuale di sociologia della cultura, Bari, Laterza.
36. Crouch C., 1999, Social Change in Western Europe, Oxford, Oxford
University Press.
37. Crouch C.,  Vitale  T.,  2019, “La globalizzazione solidale che può
recuperare le identità perdute”, Altreconomia 213, pp. 42-46.
38. Daniele  U.,  2013,  Questo  campo  fa  schifo.  Etnografia
dell'adolescenza rom fra periferie e scenari globali, Torino, Meti.
39. Daniele  U.,  Pasta  S.,  Persico  G.,  2018,  “From  Public  Enemy to
Urban Ghost. Roma Migrants  and the Dismantling of the Nomad
Camp Systems in Milan and Rome.”  Intersections. East European
Journal of Society and Politics 4 (3), pp. 106–35. 
40. De Leonardis O., Vitale T.,  2001, “Forme organizzative del terzo
settore e qualità sociale”, in La Rosa M. (ed.), Le organizzazioni nel
nuovo Welfare: l’approccio sociologico. Pubblico, privato sociale,
cooperazione e non profit, Rimini, Maggioli, pp. 113-30.
41. De  Martino  V.,  2019,  “Inclusione,  esclusione  e  diseguaglianze
sociali: lo stato dell’arte dei dati”, Palaver 8 (1), pp. 227-233.
65
Tommaso Vitale
42. Del  Fabbro  M.,  2018,  “The  Institutional  History  of  Milan
Metropolitan Area”, Territory, Politics, Governance, 6 (3), pp. 342-
361. 
43. Dubiel H., 1990, “Zivilreligion in der Massendemocratie”,  Soziale
Welt, 41, pp. 125 - 143.
44. Dumont  L.,  1983  [1992],  Essays  on  Individualism:  Modern
Ideology  in  Anthropological  Perspective,  Chicago,  University  Of
Chicago Press.
45. Fondazione Michelucci (2004), Osservatorio sugli insediamenti rom
e sinti in Toscana, Fiesole, Fondazione Giovanni Michelucci.
46. Franzese S., Spadaio M. (2005),  Rom e sinti in Piemonte, Torino,
Ires. 
47. Gauchet M., 1980, “Tocqueville, l’Amerique et nous”, Libre, n. 7.
48. Geertz  C.,  1995,  “Ethnic  Conflict:  Three  Alternative  Terms”,
Common Knowledge, 2 (3), pp. 54-65.
49. Geertz  C.,  1999, “The Pinch of  Destiny.  Religion as  Experience,
Meanning, Indentity, Power”, in Raritan, Spring.
50. Giorgi A., Itçaina X., 2016, “Religion and local politics in Southern
Europe: a research agenda”,  Religion, State, and Society 44(3), pp.
1-20. 
51. Giorgi  A.,  Vitale  T.,  2017,  ‘Migrants  in  the  public  discourse,
between media, policies and public opinion”, in Marino S., Penninx
R., Roosblad J. (eds.),  Trade Unions, Immigration and Immigrants
in Europe in the 21th Century:  New Contexts  and Challenges in
Europe. Bruxelles, ILO-Edward Edgar, pp. 66-89.
52. Hansson E., Mitchell  D., 2018, “The Exceptional State of “Roma
Beggars” in Sweden”,  European Journal of Homelessness 12 (1),
pp. 15-40.
66
Conflicts on Roma Settlements in Italian Cities: Normative Polarisation and 
Pragmatic Mediation 
53. Hirschman A. O., 1991, The Rhetoric of Reaction, Cambridge Mass,
Belknap Press.
54. Hirschman A O., 1995, “Social Conflicts as Pillars of Democratic
Market Societies”, in Hirschman A.,  Propensity to Self-Subversion,
Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press, pp. 231-248.
55. Horowitz  D.  L.,  1985,  Ethnic  Groups  in  Conflict,  Berkley,
University of California Press.
56. Jobert B., 1998, “La régulation politique: l’émergence d’un nouveau
régime  de  connaissance?”,  in  Commaille  J.,  Jobert  B.  (eds),  Les
métamorphoses de la régulation politique, Paris, LGDJ.
57. Jobin P., 2013, “Beyond Uncertainty: Industrial Hazards and Class
Actions in Taiwan & Japan”, in Liu T. (ed.), Environmental History
in East Asia: Interdisciplinary perspectives, London & New York,
Routledge, pp. 339-382.
58. King D., Le Galès P., Vitale T., 2017, “Assimilation, Security, and
Borders  in  the  Member  States”,  in  King  D.,  Le  Galès P.  (eds),
Reconfiguring European States in Crisis, Oxford, Oxford University
Press, pp. 428-450.
59. Kóczé  A.,  Rövid  M.,  2017,  “Roma  and  the  politics  of  double
discourse in contemporary Europe”, Identities 24 (6), pp. 684-700.
60. Lascoumes P., Le Galès P., 2007a, Sociologie de l’action publique,
Paris, Armand Colin.
61. Lascoumes P.,  Le  Galès  P.,  2007b, “Understanding Public Policy
through Its Instruments”,  Governance: An International Journal of
Policy, Administration, and Institutions 20 (1), pp. 1–21.
62. Le Galès P., 2018, “Urban political economy beyond convergence.
Robust but differentiated unequal European cities”, in Andreotti A.,
Benassi  D.,  Kazepov Y.,  (eds),  Western  capitalism in transition:
Global  processes,  local  challenges,  Manchester:  Manchester
University Press, pp. 217-236.
67
Tommaso Vitale
63. Le Galès  P.,  Vitale  T.,  2015, “Diseguaglianze e discontinuità nel
governo  delle  grandi  metropoli.  Un’agenda di  ricerca",  Territorio
74, pp. 7-17.
64. Lièvre  M.,  2014,  “Ceux-là  sont  peu  soignés,  peu  débrouillards”.
Ethnographie  de  Roms  roumains  migrants  à  Montpellier,
Migrations Société 26 (152), pp. 99-114.
65. Maestri G., Vitale T., 2017, “A sociology of the camps’ persisting
architecture.  Why did  Rome not  put  an  end  to  expensive  ethnic
housing  policies?”,  in  Mendes  M.,  Sá  T.,  Cabral J.  (eds),
Architecture and the Social Sciences.  Inter- and Multidisciplinary
Approaches between Society and Space, London, Springer, pp. 197-
218.
66. Mann M., 2005,  The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic
Cleansing, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
67. Mantovan C., 2016, “Antiziganismo e conflitti urbani. Punti di forza
e  ambivalenze  di  un  intervento  di  superamento  dei  “campi
nomadi””, Sociologia del diritto 43 (1), pp. 53-81
68. Mantovan C.,  2018a, “They treat  us like criminals”:  urban public
spaces and ethnic discrimination in Italy’,  Patterns of Prejudice 52
(4), pp. 338-354
69. Mantovan C., 2018b, “Cultura giuridica e politiche locali per i rom e
i  sinti:  il  caso  del  Comune di  Venezia”,  in  Pennisi  C.,  Prina F.,
Quiroz M., Reiteri M. (eds),  Amministrazione, cultura giuridica e
ricerca  empirica,  Santarcangelo  di  Romagna,  Maggioli,  pp.  365-
388.
70. Manzoni  C.,  2018,  “Exploring  Housing  Choices:  Strategies  of
Survival and Adaptation of Roma Living in Settlements”, in Allen
D.,  Greenfields  M., Smith D. (eds),  Transnational Resilience and
Change:  Gypsy,  Roma  and  Traveller  Strategies  of  Survival  and
Adaptation,  Cambridge,  Cambridge  Scholars  Publishing,  pp  114-
133.
68
Conflicts on Roma Settlements in Italian Cities: Normative Polarisation and 
Pragmatic Mediation 
71. Matras Y., Barnes K., Mills E., 2018, “Shaping Policy and Practice
through  Co-Production:  MigRom  Engagement  with  Romanian
Roma and the ‘Manchester Model.’”, Journal of Poverty and Social
Justice 26 (2), pp. 281–89.
72. Mayer N., Michelat G., Tiberj V., Vitale T., 2018, "Le lent reflux
des préjugés anti-Roms", in Commission nationale consultative des
droits de l’homme, La lutte contre le racisme, l’antisémitisme et la
xénophobie.  Année  2017,  Paris,  La  Documentation  Française,  pp.
107-124.
73. McGarry  A.,  2017,  Romaphobia.  The  Last  Acceptable  Form  of
Racism, London, Zed Books. 
74. McGarry A., Timofey A., 2014, “Unpacking the Roma Participation
Puzzle:  Presence,  Voice  and  Influence”,  Journal  of  Ethnic  and
Migration Studies 40 (12), pp. 1972-1990.
75. Morales  L.,  Castelli  Gattinara  P.,  2017,  “The  politicization  and
securitization  of  migration  in  Western  Europe:  Public  opinion,
political  parties and the immigration issue”, in Bourbeau P. (ed.),
Handbook on Migration and Security,  Cheltenham, Edward Elgar
Publishing, pp. , 273–295.
76. Olivera  M.,  2016,  “Un  projet  ‘pour  les  Roms’?  Bricolages,
malentendus  et  informalité  productive  dans  des  dispositifs
d'insertion et de relogement”, Lien social et Politiques, 76, pp. 224-
252. 
77. Olzak  S.,  1992,  Dynamics  of  Ethnic  Competition  and  Conflict,
Stanford, Stanford University Press.
78. Pais  I.,  Polizzi  E.,  Vitale  T.,  2019,  “Governare  l’economia
collaborativa  per  produrre  inclusione:  attori,  strumenti,  stili  di
relazione e problemi di  implementazione”,  in  Andreotti,  A.  (ed.),
Governare Milano nel nuovo millennio, Bologna, il Mulino, 2019,
pp. 215-37.
69
Tommaso Vitale
79. Pasta S., Vitale T., 2018, “‘Mi guardano male, ma io non guardo’.
Come i rom e i sinti in Italia reagiscono allo stigma”, in Alietti A.
(ed.), Razzismi, discriminazioni e diseguaglianze. Analisi e ricerche
sull'Italia contemporanea, Milano, Mimesis, pp. 217-241. 
80. Pasta  S.,  Vitale  T.,  Boschetti  L.,  Persico  G.,  2019,  "I  cicli  di
segregazione e sgomberi a Milano", in Vitale T. (ed.), Inchiesta sui
campi rom, Firenze, La casa Usher.
81. Persico  G.,  2015,  L’occasione  di  diventare  mondo:  Una  lettura
pedagogica  dei  rapporti  tra  Rom,  Sinti  e  Calòn  ed  istituzioni,
Parma, Junior Edizioni. 
82. Picker, G., Roccheggiani, G., 2014. “Abnormalising minorities. The
state and expert knowledge addressing the Roma in Italy”, Identities
21 (2), pp. 185–201.
83. Pin C., Galimberti D., 2016, “Making metropolis : innovation issues
and  local  governance  in  Paris  and  Milan”,  in  Cole  A.,  Payre  R.
(eds),  Cities as Political  Objects.  Historical  Evolution, Analytical
Categorisation and Institutional Challenges of Metropolitanisation,
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, pp. 197-217.
84. Pizzorno  A.,  1993,  Le  radici  della  politica  assoluta,  Milano,
Feltrinelli.
85. Pizzorno A., 2000, "Risposte e proposte", in Della Porta D., Greco
M.,  Szakolczai  A.,  Identità,  riconoscimento,  scambio,  Roma,
Laterza.
86. Pizzorno  A.,  2007,  Il  velo  della  diversità.  Studi  su  razionalità  e
riconoscimento, Milano, Feltrinelli.
87. Polizzi E., Tajani C., Vitale T., 2013,  Programmare i territori del
welfare. Attori, meccanismi ed effetti, Roma, Carocci.
88. Powell  R.,  Lever  J.,  2017,  “Europe’s  perennial  ‘outsiders’:  A
processual  approach  to  Roma  stigmatization  and  ghettoization”,
Current Sociology 65 (5), pp. 680-699.
70
Conflicts on Roma Settlements in Italian Cities: Normative Polarisation and 
Pragmatic Mediation 
89. Prasad  M.,  2006,  The  Politics  of  Free  Markets,  Chicago,  The
University of Chicago Press.
90. Rosa E., 2019, “Why self-care matters for Roma people and beyond.
Vulnerability  and  the  (un)making  of  water  and  sanitation
infrastructure  at  the  margins  of  the  city”,  Geoforum,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2019.02.008.
91. Semprebon  M.,  Haddock  Vicari  S.,  2016,  “Innovative  housing
practices involving immigrants: the case of self-building in Italy”,
Journal of Housing and the Built Environment 31(3), pp. 439-445.
92. Sigona  N.,  2003,  “How Can a  “Nomad” Be  a  Refugee?  Kosovo
Roma and Labelling Policy in Italy”, Sociology 1, pp. 69-79.
93. Simmel  G.,  1908  [1955],  Conflict  and  the  Web  of  Group-
Affiliations, New York, Free Press.
94. Stavo-Debauge  J.,  2005,  "Mobilising statistical  powers  for  action
against discriminations",  International Social Science Journal, 183,
pp.43-55.
95. Tremlett  A.,  Messing V.,  Kóczé A.,  2017,  “Romaphobia and  the
media:  mechanisms of power and the politics of representations”,
Identities 24 (6), pp. 641-649.
96. Turner R. H., 1996, “The moral issue in collective behaviour and
collective action”, Mobilization, 1 (1), pp. 1 - 15. 
97. Vacca R., Solano G., Lubbers M.J., Molina J.L., McCarty C., 2018,
“A  Personal  Network  Approach  to  the  Study  of  Immigrant
Structural Assimilation and Transnationalism”, Social Networks 53,
pp. 72–89.
98. Vitale  T.,  2007,  “Conflitti  urbani  e  spazi  pubblici:  tensioni  fra
partecipazione e rappresentanza”,  in Segatori  R. (ed.),  Mutamenti
della politica nell’Italia contemporanea.  Governance,  democrazia
deliberativa  e  partecipazione  politica,  Soveria  Mannelli,
Rubbettino, pp. 159-73.
71
Tommaso Vitale
99. Vitale T., 2008, “Politiche locali per i rom e i sinti, fra dinamiche di
consenso e effettività eugenetica”, in Amendola A., Bazzicalupo L.,
Chicchi F., Tucci A. (eds),  Biopolitica, bioeconomia e processi di
soggettivazione, Macerata-Roma, Quodlibet, pp. 121-32. 
100. Vitale  T.,  2009,  “Politique  des  évictions:  Une  approche
pragmatique" in Cantelli F., Roca i Escoda M., Stavo- Debauge J.,
Pattaroni  L.,  Sensibilités  pragmatiques.  Enquêter  sur  l'action
publique, Bruxelles, Peter Lang, pp. 71-92..
101. Vitale T.,  2015,  "Territorial  Conflicts and New Forms of
Left-Wing  Political  Organization:  from  Political  Opportunity
Structure  to  Structural  Contexts  of  Opportunities”,  Sociologica.
Italian journal of sociology on line 9 (3). DOI: 10.2383/82475.
102. Vitale  T.,  Boschetti  L.,  2011,  “«Les  Roms  ne  sont  pas
encore prêts à se représenter eux-mêmes!» Asymétries et tensions
entre groupes Roms et associations «gadjé» à Milan”, in Berger M.,
Cefaï  D.,  Gayet-Viaud  C.  (eds),  Du  civil  au  politique.
Ethnographies du vivre-ensemble, Bruxelles, P.I.E. Peter Lang), pp.
403-29. 
103. Vitale  T.,  Podestà  N.,  2011,  "Territori  e  innovazione
politica:  successi  e  fallimenti  dell’azione conflittuale”,  in  Podestà
N., Vitale T. (eds), Dalla proposta alla protesta, e ritorno. Conflitti
locali e innovazione politica, Milano, Bruno Mondadori, pp. 1-33.
104. Vitale T., Tosi S., 2019, “De l’usage comparatif des « Studi
di comunità »”, in Authier J.-Y., Baggioni V., Cousin B., Fijalkow
Y.,  Launay  L.  (eds),  D’une  ville  à  l’autre.  La  comparaison
internationale en sociologie urbaine, Paris, La Découverte, pp. 123-
140.
105. Wimmer  A.,  2013,  Ethnic  Boundary  Making,  Princeton,
Princeton University Press.
72
Conflicts on Roma Settlements in Italian Cities: Normative Polarisation and 
Pragmatic Mediation 
Acknowledgements
Data  belongs  to  the  research  programs  REPIN  (Les  “Roms
migrants” : des processus d’exclusion urbaine aux ressources pour
l’insertion),  directed  by  Tommaso  Vitale  at  the  Centre  d’études
européennes  et  de  politique  comparée  of  Sciences  Po  (Paris,
France);  RONEPP  (Roma  Networks  and  Political  Participation),
directed by Tommaso Vitale at the Centre d’études européennes et
de politique comparée  of  Sciences Po (Paris,  France);  MARG-IN
(project number ANR-15-CE28-0006): MARGinalisation/INclusion:
les effets à moyen et à long terme des politiques de régulation de la
pauvreté étrangère sur les populations-cibles : le cas des migrants
dits « roms » dans les villes d’Europe occidentale (France, Italie,
Espagne),  directed by Olivier Legros (CITERES), Céline Bergeon
(MIGRINTER) and Tommaso Vitale (CEE). REPIN and RONEPP
have  been  financed  by  the  Bureau  Scientifique  de  Sciences  Po.
MARG-IN has been financed by the French Agency ANR.
Comments  from  the  editors  of  this  special  issue  of  Palaver,
anonymous reviewers, and Carlo Barone, Paul Jobin, Jens Rydgren
have greatly improved previous drafts.
73

